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Repacholi, B. Early reasoning about desires: evidence from and month-olds. We expected the subtypes to be correlated, and the correlation to depend on age.
That is, the degree of differentiation is expected to be the largest at ages where ToM has rapid growth. Less differentiation, and hence greater correlations between subtypes, is to be expected in early stages of ToM. The analyses were based on the typically developing children from Study 1. We calculated composite variables for the ToM Storybooks: for the different tasks, means were calculated over theoretically similar items.
SCA-P, which is a variant of principal component analysis, estimates one pattern matrix for all three groups. As a result, the interpretation of the components or factors is equal for all groups, but the correlations between components and standard deviations of the component scores can differ across groups. To determine the number of components, the scree-test Cattell , the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule Kaiser , and the substantive meaning of components, was used.
Only minimum loadings of 0. Finally, composite variables had to show adequate specificity for their components. Subsequently, internal consistency reliability was calculated for the components found.
The scree plot of the SCA-P did not give a clear indication for five components. The eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule indicated that seven components should be retained. We established the number of components on the basis of the substantive content of the components, determining whether increasing the number of factors still allowed the items of a factor to measure a clinical concept.
A solution consisting of five components provided the best interpretation. This solution accounted for The pattern matrix was rotated using the oblique Promax rotation criterion.
Two other composite variables did not fit this structure, namely desire action and seeing-is-knowing. The correlations between the components varied from 0. To assess the degree of differentiation in the three age groups, inter-factor correlations between the five components were computed within the three age groups. The component analysis resulted in a structure that largely corresponds with the underlying theoretical constructs from the test.
This is not surprising, since the composite variable consists of too few questions only two. The inter-factor correlations are consistent with the expectations: they are high in the youngest children implying that ToM abilities are not yet differentiated. In order to examine the reliability of the ToM Storybooks, we calculated the internal test consistency, test—retest reliability and inter-rater reliability. In addition, we examined the possibility of diminished test performance due to nuisance factors such as fatigue or boredom.
For the internal test consistency, the data of the typically developing children from Study 1 were used. For the test—retest reliability, a subgroup of 45 typically developing children age 3—7 was tested again, with the second administration occurring 2—3 weeks later. We presume that ToM ability remains relatively constant when reassessed after such a short period. For the analysis of possible diminishing test performance at the end of the test, the data of the typically developing children was used.
The test—retest reliability was established by means of a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Five independent raters scored the justifications and the correlations between these five raters were calculated. This was done in two manners: a flexible manner by points awarded to the justifications 2, 1 or 0 points compare Appendix B and a stringent manner by justification category chosen compare Appendix C.
To examine whether the test scores were affected by nuisance factors such as fatigue or boredom, it was checked if the results over the various storybooks showed a significant decline. Books 2—5 were considered, because they have a similar item structure see Study 1. Since children could choose the order of the books, the average total score of the actual presentation of those books were compared.
If nuisance played a part, the last presented book should result in a lower score than the first presented book. The internal consistency of the ToM Storybooks was good. Concerning nuisance effects, no statistically significant decrease in total scores per book were found during the test administration; this applied for the total group as well as for the three separate age groups separately for test performance from beginning to end of testing, see Table 6.
Based on the minimum standard for reliability of 0. This is an adequate value for a test aimed at young children and is consistent with findings from comparable research on standard and complex FB tasks Hughes et al. However, a significant increase in ToM total scores was found at the second measurement in typically developing children.
Such a rise is not surprising, since it can be expected that young children learn from being tested Grigorenko and Sternberg For instance, a difference of six IQ points can also be found in test—retest research with intelligence tests e.
Tellegen et al. A similar observation has also been reported in ToM research in typically developing children Muris et al. They seemed not to have learned from their former experience. This finding may form an important point of attention in evaluating children with suspected ToM problems. There were no differences in difficulty in judging the justifications of typically developing children versus children with PDD-NOS.
There was also no evidence for a statistically significant negative effect on the test scores due to increasing fatigue or boredom during the test administration. We tested both the convergent and divergent validity of the ToM Storybooks. Concerning convergent validity, correlations with three similar tests were calculated. Concerning divergent validity, correlations with language and intelligence tests were calculated.
The latter can be considered moderator variables in performance on ToM tests, but should not be considered to be equal to ToM. Despite their diversity, we do expect to find a positive relationship between ToM scores and scores on a language test, since ToM questions make a relatively strong appeal to lexical and syntactic knowledge see for instance Garfield et al. We also expect a positive relationship with verbal IQ Hughes et al.
Children were referred to an outpatient clinic for child and adolescent psychiatry. After an extensive psycho-diagnostic and psychiatric examination which included parent interviews and play contacts with the child , the children were diagnosed as having PDD-NOS pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified according to DSM-IV criteria APA Their ages ranged from four up to and including 8 years see Table 7. There were 24 boys and 6 girls, resulting in a sex ratio of 4—1, which is the average sex ratio found in children with autism compare Yeargin-Allsopp et al.
In order to check the validity of the clinical diagnosis, two additional tests were administered: the Vineland adaptive behavior scales VABS Sparrow et al.
The VABS is an interview in which parents are questioned about the actual social behavior and skills of their child. We used parts of the expanded form of the VABS.
For each child the discrepancy between the Vineland age equivalent in months and the chronological age in months was computed VA-CA. The results showed that these children had large and negative discrepancy scores in receptive language, playing skills, interpersonal relationships and coping skills see also Serra et al. Their problems with expressive language and daily living skills community were less profound Paul et al.
The parents also filled in the CBSQ. This is a questionnaire in which parents report autism-related behavior. It can be used to facilitate selection of PDD samples for research purposes Hartman et al. Next, all children participated in an extensive psychological examination which included the assessment of intelligence Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised: Wechsler ; Dutch version, and the level of language comprehension.
Concerning the latter, two Dutch language tests were used, depending on the age of the child. Concerning convergent validity, two additional questionnaires and one test were included. In contrast with the ToM Storybooks, it also includes second-order-belief tasks.
There were also four groups of typically developing children involved in Study 4. The first group is a subsample of 30 control children drawn from the typically developing children from Study 1. This control group was used to make comparisons with the clinical group. The second is a subsample of typically developing children drawn from the group of typically developing children in Study 1; 3—9 years.
This control group was used to explore the relationship of ToM scores and language scores in typically developing children. The third is a subsample of typically developing children drawn from the typically developing children in Study 1; 3—7 years. For these children, intelligence scores were available. They received a nonverbal intelligence test. Footnote 3 This control group was used to explore the relationship between ToM scores and IQ scores in typically developing children.
The fourth group is a subsample of typically developing children drawn from the typically developing children in Study 1, 3—8 years; 54 boys and 52 girls. For these children, VABS questionnaire scores were available. This control group was used to explore the relationship between ToM Scores and VABS questionnaire scores in typically developing children. Divergent validity was tested by comparing the ToM quotient scores with language scores and IQ scores by calculating Pearson product-moment correlations.
They had significantly lower scores on the mental physical tasks, the belief-action tasks, the belief-emotion tasks and the desire-action tasks. No significant differences were found for the emotion-recognition tasks and the desire-emotion tasks see Table 8. The correlations of the ToM Storybooks with other tests can be found in Table 9.
Thus, a higher ToM score implies higher sociability. The correlation with language comprehension in typically developing children varies for the different language tests from 0. Concerning IQ, in typically developing children only a performance IQ was obtained. The correlation with ToM-Q was 0. In addition, they have problems on emotion recognition, real-imaginary, real-mental, close impostor, and desire-action tasks.
These findings largely agree with the findings from Serra et al. Despite differences in p -values, the findings from both studies coincide. The only contrary finding is that beliefs used to predict actions were significantly more difficult for children with PDD-NOS than for typically developing children, whereas Serra and colleagues found the opposite.
The finding from the present study, however, is more consistent with clinical expectations. The construct validity of the ToM Storybooks is good, both for the convergent and the divergent validity. Concerning the convergent validity, substantial correlations with ToM-related tests were found. Average negative correlations were found with all subscales. It is known that executive functions are somehow linked with ToM development e.
Carlson et al. Our results agree to a large extent with the results of Frith et al. Purely speculatively, the differences in results can be due to the restricted use of FB measurements Smarties test and Three Boxes test instead of a comprehensive ToM test in a more seriously affected group children with an autistic disorder compared to children with PDD-NOS in our research.
The ToM Storybooks test also has adequate discriminant validity. For future research, examining the applicability and discriminatory power of the ToM Storybooks, it is recommended to include children with an autistic disorder and other clinical groups, like for instance children with ADHD. Also, correlations with IQ scores were inspected. The verbal IQ results of the children with PDD-NOS were somewhat lower than the normal sample, which is often seen in subsamples of children with autism compare Joseph et al.
As regards the correlations with IQ scores, our research showed a significant correlation with PIQ for the typically developing group compare Muris et al.
Final conclusions on the differences between these two groups cannot be drawn since different IQ tests were used. As concerns future research on the relationship between IQ and ToM, the present authors recommend the use of a comprehensive ToM instrument, as was done in the present study and in studies of Hughes and colleagues, and Muris and colleagues.
However, this is not surprising. One could say that, if we look at intelligence in a broad way, comprehensive ToM instruments measure a specific aspect of intelligence, namely a kind of social intelligence. After all, these tests look into the logical reasoning of people and correlations of one type of intelligence with another are highly common.
In addition, intelligence contributes to acquiring ToM skills, making it possible for children to understand connections between causes and results. In that view, comparison with IQ should perhaps not be considered as a test for divergent validity. This article presented the construction and validation of the ToM Storybooks. It is a comprehensive ToM test, measuring different basic ToM components, but also associated aspects.
In Study 1 the construction of this test was discussed. The test holds 34 tasks, spread over six storybooks. A ToM sumscore and a ToM quotient score can be calculated. In Study 2, analyses showed an agreement between the underlying theoretical constructs and the components found through component analysis.
Study 3 looked into the reliability of the test. Internal consistency, test—retest reliability and inter-rater reliability were found good. Lastly, Study 4 assessed the construct validity of the ToM Storybooks.
Convergent validity, based on two questionnaires and an additional ToM test, was good. The ToM-score had high correlations with language tests and IQ tests, as was expected. It can be concluded that the validity and reliability of the ToM Storybooks complies with the requirements of an instrument of this sort. The separate findings are consistent with findings of other researches, but also agree with the more general findings of Wellman and colleagues on FB tasks , which show that researchers can vary the tasks over an extended set of possibilities without influencing the performance of children.
The reliance of this kind of task on language comprehension with this kind of population, may lead to potential complications. Children with weak language comprehension undoubtedly will have more problems with successfully completing the test. The literature shows that there are strong relationships between language and ToM Astington and Baird ; Astington and Jenkins ; de Villiers ; Tager-Flusberg In addition, many children with autism have language problems.
In people with autism, ToM results are correlated to verbal mental age Frith et al. However, early research has shown that language problems do not contribute to mental state impairment, because children with for instance semantic language impairment do not show such problems Leslie and Frith ; Perner et al. On the other hand, the influence of language on ToM development should not be underestimated Ruffman et al. Language is a medium through which children learn about beliefs Astington Reading storybooks, for instance, form a rich source of mentalizing information for children Dyer et al.
The test includes a wider range of ToM aspects commonly tested. It includes not only tasks on first-order beliefs and desires, but also tasks on associated aspects such as the distinction between mental and physical entities.
It is a comprehensive test consisting of tasks with different developmental challenges. The primary advantage of this test over existing batteries is that it targets skills that develop in typically developing children prior to the age of five, and further refine and increase during the early school years.
The test, however, is applicable beyond the age of five; it has norm scores up to the age of 12 years and thus allows for comparisons between children of widely varying age, which makes it particularly appropriate for comparison with clinical groups in which ToM development is delayed. As a consequence, this test may have potential for a range of applications to both fundamental and applied work. Moreover, since this study covers a wider age range than is normally included in ToM research, valid comparisons between older children with ToM problems and their age mates with normal ToM functioning can be made.
We like to remark that the older age group included in this study is not intended for discrimination between typically developing children, but between older children with clinical diagnosis.
Since older typically developing children have, as a group, a smaller range in ToM total scores, a lower ToM score on these simple ToM tasks is very informative. Because of the use of simple ToM tasks and a motivating storyline, the test might also be useful in the field of intellectual disability, where autism spectrum disorders and related ToM problems are common.
However, for future research it is advisable to include more complicated ToM tasks, such as a second-order belief task see for instance Hughes et al. The test—retest correlations of the typically developing children suggested a small learning effect.
As stated before, this is consistent with findings from Muris et al. Grigorenko and Sternberg recommended that this effect—the learning potential of individual children—be included in normal diagnostics.
In that case, the pretest—posttest difference can eventually be considered an estimation of learning abilities that are, at least in part, ToM specific. The absence of a comparable learning effect in specific groups of children, like we have found in children with PDD-NOS, could provide interesting information about the nature of ToM abilities in such children. In this line, further research on ToM might profit from dynamic testing—as opposed to static testing—where the learning potential of a child is quantified on the basis of his or her understanding and use of feedback given during testing Grigorenko and Sternberg Dynamic indexes can represent a quality step-up compared with static indexes Fabio To conclude, one of the methodological strengths of the current test is that it has extended the limitations common in the majority of the researches done in the field of ToM.
Most research has been undertaken in young children only mostly up to 6 years, with a major focus on 3—4 year olds , has used only a few tasks FB tasks, mainly single tasks and considered small research groups exceptions in the latter can be found in Charman et al.
The present research, aimed at constructing a new ToM Storybooks, used a wide range of tasks not only FB tasks and consisted of a substantial number of children over a wide age range. The test not only allows for comparisons on the basis of raw scores but standardized norms and norm scores are also available Blijd-Hoogewys et al. In our opinion, the ToM Storybooks provide a comprehensive, valid and reliable instrument for researchers and clinicians who wish to measure Theory-of-Mind in young typically developing children, as well as children with an autism spectrum disorder from a broader age range.
Also children older than 5 years were tested, in order to determine the upper-age limit of the test. In addition, testing older children makes comparisons between children with and without ToM problems easier. Non-graphical elements are distributed sparsely across the text; manipulation of these elements is not a necessary condition for answering the test. None of the children from clinical populations to which the test has been administered so far has shown any sign of disturbance or aversion for the non-graphical elements.
The division between verbal IQ and performance IQ can be very informative in children with autism spectrum disorders. Since the NT group also consists of children younger than 6 years, the WISC could not been applied and a nonverbal intelligence test was preferred.
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Mind and language , 7 , 11— Smith Eds. Grigorenko, E. Dynamic testing. Psychological Bulletin , , 75— The greatest growth of this ability to attribute mental states is believed to take place primarily during the preschool years between the ages of 3 and 5. However, a number of different factors are believed to exert some influence on the development of a theory of mind. Some researchers have suggested that gender and the number of siblings in the home can affect how the theory of mind emerges.
Theory of mind develops as children gain greater experience with social interactions. Play, pretend, stories, and relationships with parents and peers allow children to develop stronger insight into how other people's thinking may differ from their own.
Social experiences also help children learn more about how thinking influences actions. The growth of theory of mind skills tends to improve progressively and sequentially with age.
While many theory of mind abilities emerge during the preschool years, research has shown that kids between the ages of 6 and 8 are still developing these skills. In studies, children at this age were still not completely proficient at all theory of mind tasks. Researchers have also found that children under the age of 3 typically answer questions on the theory of mind tasks incorrectly. By age 4, children usually demonstrate a better theory of mind comprehension.
For example, by age 4, most children are able to understand that others may hold false beliefs about objects, people, or situations. One study found that children typically progress through five different theory of mind abilities in sequential, standard order. Studies have also found that the theory of mind can be unstable. In other words, children may be able to understand mental states in some situations, but struggle in others. While kids may be able to pass most or all theory of mind tasks at the age of 4, their abilities continue to improve and develop through late adolescence and into adulthood.
Some studies also suggest that individual differences in theory of mind abilities are related to a child's social competence. Perhaps not surprisingly, kids who are more adept at thinking about what other people are thinking tend to have stronger social abilities. So how exactly do psychologists go about measuring how people think about their own thoughts and thoughts of others?
One of the most commonly used methods to assess a child's theory of mind abilities is known as a false-belief task. The ability to attribute false belief in others is considered a major milestone in the formation of a theory of mind. The goal of such tasks is to require children to make inferences about what someone has done or what they are thinking when the other person's beliefs about reality are in conflict with what children currently know.
In other words, children may know something is true; an understanding of false belief requires them to understand that other people may not be aware of this truth. For example, a child might know that there are no cookies left in the cookie jar—but does he understand that his sister has no way of knowing that there are no cookies left?
How do false belief tasks used in psychology experiments work? In the "Sally-Anne test," one of the most frequently used false-belief scenarios, children are shown two dolls named Sally and Anne:. So what do the children's responses indicate about their theory of mind? Children pass the test if they say that Sally will look in the basket.
This demonstrates that these children understand that Sally holds a false belief about where the marble really is. In order to pass the test, children must be able to think about what Sally thinks and believes.
Children who say that the marble is in the box, however, do not pass the test. They fail to demonstrate their own understanding that Sally's knowledge is different from their own. While the theory of mind has historically been assessed using only false-belief tasks, current approaches involve measuring across a scale of developmental tasks.
Doing so better allows researchers to see how different the theory of mind milestones emerges as children age. For example, the ability to understand what other people desire emerges before the ability to understand hidden emotions that people may be feeling.
While the emergence of a theory of mind tends to follow a fairly predictable sequence over the course of normal development, sometimes things go wrong. Theory of mind problems can have a range of serious complications. When people struggle to understand mental states, social relationships, and interactions can suffer.
Researchers Simon Baron-Cohen and his colleagues have suggested that theory of mind problems are one of the hallmarks of autism. In a study, they looked at how children with autism performed on the theory of mind tasks compared to children with Down's Syndrome as well as neurotypical children.
This problem with perspective-taking and understanding the thoughts of others is thought to contribute to the difficulty that those with autism spectrum disorders have with some types of social interactions. Studies have also shown that people who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia often also demonstrate the theory of mind deficits.
One meta-analysis involving more than 1, participants showed significant impairments in theory of mind among those with schizophrenia. These participants showed problems with both the ability to understand false beliefs as well as the ability to infer the intentions of others.
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